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We study a canonical model of gambling, namely Kelly’s horse races, from the point of view of
Stochastic Thermodynamics. We find optimal betting strategies that gives the highest capital growth
rate while keeping a certain low value of risk fluctuations. We analyze the trade-off between the
average and the fluctuations of the growth rate, first for two horses then for an arbitrary number
of horses, and for uncorrelated or correlated races. We find an analog of a phase transition with a
coexistence between two optimal strategies, where one has risk and the other one does not. The
above trade-off is also embodied in a general bound on the average growth rate, similar to uncertainty
relations. We also prove mathematically the absence of other phase transitions between Kelly’s point
and the risk free strategy.
PACS numbers: 05.70.Ln, 05.40.-a 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
Developed in 1956 by Bell Labs scientist
John Kelly, Kelly’s criterion applied the newly
created field of information theory to gambling
and investment [1]. Largely popularized in
books [2], this criterion allows a gambler (or
investment fund) to fix what proportion of
bankroll should be risked on a given bet. It es-
sentially exploits side information to maximize
the expected geometric growth rate of a capital.
This work was precursor to the growth optimal
portfolio theory, which applied these ideas to
capital market [3]. The ensemble of optimal in-
vestment strategies forms an efficient border [4],
or equivalently a Pareto front [5, 6], which is a
term used in engineering and economics to call
the set of designs that represent best trade-offs
between different conflicting requirements.
Recently, there has been a surge of inter-
est in applying insights from optimal gambling
theory and economy to biology. Kelly’s work
led to an essential clarification of the concept of
information value in biology [7, 8], which was
very helpful to understand strategies used by
biological systems in a fluctuating environment.
In particular the bet-hedging strategy turned
out to be precisely an optimal strategy of the
Kelly type [9, 10].
In a different field, namely Stochastic Ther-
modynamics, which has many links to biology
and information theory, thermodynamic trade-
offs are being intensively studied [11–14], follow-
ing the discovery of uncertainty relations[15, 16].
One might therefore ask whether these new
methods could shed light on the classic trade-
offs known in gambling, and ultimately improve
our understanding of evolutionary tradeoffs in
biology. In this Letter, we build new connec-
tions between gambling and Stochastic Thermo-
dynamics on top of existing ones [17–20]. We
study the efficient border of Kelly’s model, and
we find that it extends to a region of negative
growth, never discussed in the literature to our
knowledge, corresponding to catastrophic gam-
bling strategies. While optimal protocols are
a classic topic in Stochastic Thermodynamics
[21–23], phase transitions among optimal pro-
tocols are a recent topic [24]. Inspired by this
recent work, we identify similar phase transi-
tions in optimal gambling strategies. We first
prove such a result for uncorrelated races, and
involving only two horses, which we then gen-
eralize to an arbitrary number of horses and
to correlated races. In addition, we also give a
general proof of the convexity in the most useful
part of the front (positive part of the tradeoff
branch), which rules out the existence of further
phase transitions on that branch.
II. KELLY’S HORSE RACES
Let us recall here the main features of
Kelly’s horse race [1]. This race involves M
horses, which are numbered as 1, 2...M . The
odds paid by the bookmaker when the horse x
wins is ox, and the probability for this to hap-
pen is px. A gambler can distribute his bets on
the different horses, let bx be the fraction of the
bet set on horse x, so that
∑M
x=1 bx = 1. For
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Figure 1: Logarithm of the capital of the gambler
versus the number of races, for the optimal
strategy (Kelly’s) (thick red line) and for a
selection of three non-optimal strategies (thin
blue lines).
all x, bx > 0, because the gambler bets on all
horses but only makes money from the horse x
that wins.
Since all the money gained is reinvested
in the next race, the capital of the gambler is
multiplied by the factor oxbx after each race,
and the important quantity is the long term
growth rate of the capital CN after N races
which has the form
lim
N→∞
1
N
lnCN =
∑
x
px ln(oxbx), (1)
where the equality follows from the law of large
numbers. Let us introduce the random variable
Wx = ln(oxbx) which describes the contribution
of horse x to this growth rate. Its average with
respect to the probability density px, is the long
term growth rate denoted 〈W 〉.
Kelly’s strategy is defined from the opti-
mization of this average growth rate over the
betting strategy defined by bx. A simple cal-
culation given the constraint
∑
x bx = 1 leads
to the proportional betting strategy b∗x = px.
This particular solution is independent of the
odds ox, but if there was a track take, the opti-
mal solution would depend on both ox and px
[1]. The growth of the capital is exponential
and Kelly’s strategy dominates on long times
all non-optimal strategies as shown in Fig. 1.
A central result of Stochastic Thermody-
namics, namely fluctuation relations, has been
derived for this gambling model by Hirono et al.
[20]. In its simplest form, such a relation holds
for Kelly’s strategy and reads :
〈e−W 〉 =
∑
x
px
1
oxpx
=
∑
x
1
ox
= 1, (2)
where we have used the normalization of the
distribution rx = 1/ox valid when there is no
track take (fair odds). By Jensen’s inequality,
Eq. (2) implies 〈W 〉 ≥ 0, which also follows
from 〈W 〉 = D(p|r) ≥ 0 where D(p|r) denotes
the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the
distributions p and r. This fluctuation relation
(2) can be generalized for an arbitrary strategy
of the gambler, not necessarily that of Kelly,
and when the odds are not necessarily fair, by
introducing the decomposition W˜x = Wx + Ix,
where Wx = ln(oxbx) as above, W˜x = ln(oxpx)
and Ix = ln(px/bx). Indeed, we have then
〈e−W˜ 〉 = 〈e−W−I〉 = Λ, (3)
with Λ =
∑
x 1/ox. In the same way that Eq. (2)
is the analog of Jarzynski equality, Eq. (3) is
similar to its generalization by Sagawa and Ueda
[25]. By Jensen’s inequality, the second-law like
inequality 〈W 〉 ≥ −〈I〉 − ln Λ, follows which
reduces to 〈W 〉 ≥ 0 in the particular case of
Kelly’s strategy with fair odds. Note that in the
general case, 〈W 〉 can a priori be of any sign.
III. MEAN-VARIANCE TRADEOFF :
CHOICE OF UTILITY FUNCTION
Kelly’s strategy focuses on the maximiza-
tion of the growth rate at the price of over-
looking risk. Although bankruptcy is absent
in Kelly’s scenario because the growth of the
capital is geometric instead of arithmetic, the
fluctuations of the capital are large as shown in
Fig. 1 and represents a major concern. This
problem has been widely recognized in the gam-
bling community. In practice gamblers and in-
vestors know that optimal Kelly can be âĂĲ-
too riskyâĂİ; and that âĂĲfractional KellyâĂİ
should be preferred, which deviates from the op-
timal solution but reduces the effective variance
of the stochastic growth [3].
In the same spirit, we study here the op-
timal betting strategy that gives the highest
capital growth rate while keeping a certain low
value of risky fluctuations and analyze the cor-
responding trade-off between risk and gain. A
similar idea is behind the mean-variance anal-
ysis introduced by Markowitz optimization [4].
In contrast with Markowitz optimization how-
ever, which considers the mean and variance of
the capital return, we consider here the mean
and the variance of the (long-term) growth rate
of the capital. This important conceptual dif-
ference allows us to recover Kelly’s point as
a special case of our analysis, whereas Kelly’s
point could not appear as a limiting case of
Markowitz’s optimization for this reason. Hence,
our utility function is a linear combination of
3the mean and standard deviation of the growth
rate, namely 〈W 〉 and σW :
J˜ = α〈W 〉 − (1− α)σW , (4)
with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In practice, we use the modified
utility function
J = α〈W 〉 − (1− α)σW + λ
∑
x
bx, (5)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier associated to
the normalization of the bets. An optimization
of J with respect to bx leads to λ = −α. By
reporting this into Eq. (5), the optimal bets bx
are solutions of :
px − bx = γ
σW
px [ln(oxbx)− 〈W 〉] , (6)
where γ = (1− α)/α. As expected, when α = 1
(γ = 0), we recover the proportional betting of
Kelly’s strategy, which maximizes 〈W 〉. Instead
when α = 0 (γ →∞), we obtain the null strat-
egy also called the risk free strategy, because in
this case 〈W 〉 = σW = 0. Between these two
values, the strategy of the gambler is described
as mixed since it combines aspects associated to
the optimization of 〈W 〉 and σW .
IV. EXACT SOLUTION FOR TWO
HORSES
Before embarking on the full problem with
an arbitrary number of horses, it is instructive
to analyze the fully solvable case of two horses.
Let the probability that the first horse wins
(resp. loses) be p (resp. 1 − p); the bet and
the odd on the first (resp. second) horse are b
and 1/r (resp. 1− b and 1/(1− r)) and let us
introduce the parameter σ =
√
p(1− p).
From the optimization of J , we obtain the
optimal strategy b± :
b± = p± γσ, (7)
where the + (resp. −) sign corresponds to an
overbetting (resp. underbetting) strategy with
respect to Kelly’s strategy where b = p.
By reporting the optimal bet given by
Eq. (B3) into the expression of J , one obtains
the efficient border. As shown in Fig. 2, this
border has two branches which meet at Kelly’s
point. When p < r the lower blue solid line is the
trade-off branch associated with b+, while the
upper red solid line is the non-trade-off branch,
associated with b−. The roles of b− and b+ ex-
change when instead p > r. Let us first focus
on the region where 〈W 〉 ≥ 0.
−1.0 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0
〈W 〉
0.0
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Figure 2: Trade-off branch (lower blue solid line)
and non-trade-off branch (upper red solid line)
in the plane (〈W 〉, σW ) for two horses and
for the parameters (p = 0.2, r = 0.4). The
two branches meet at the red square (Kelly’s
strategy), and the blue circle represents the
null strategy.
We find that the slope of the Pareto border
is
dσW
d〈W 〉
∣∣∣∣
γ
= σ
p− b , (8)
where b is equal to b− when r < p [26]. There-
fore the slope of the Pareto border is infinite at
Kelly’s point where b± = p; while it reaches a
finite value near the null strategy, namely
dσW
d〈W 〉
∣∣∣∣
γc
= 1
γc
= σ|p− r| . (9)
This signals a phase transition at this critical
value γc, where the optimal strategy changes
from the null strategy to a mixed strategy. As
a result, the optimal J versus γ changes from
zero when γ ≥ γc (null strategy) to a non-zero
value when γ ≤ γc (mixed strategy). For two
horses, such a plot is similar to what is shown
for three horses in the inset of Fig. 3.
To prove the existence of the phase transi-
tion, we have checked that the border is convex
near the null strategy. It is indeed the case since
d2σW
d〈W 〉2
∣∣∣∣
γ=γc
= r(1− r)
σ2γ3c
> 0. (10)
In the rest of this paper, we now focus on the
general case for an arbitrary number of horses.
4V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Let us now explain how to obtain the Pareto
front from a numerical optimization of the utility
function using a simulated annealing algorithm,
as illustrated in Fig. 3 for the case of three
horses. Similarly to the case of two horses case,
the lower and upper branch correspond to dif-
ferent optimization problems. The lower branch
is formed by bets that maximize the growth
rate 〈W 〉 for a given value of the fluctuations
σW , whereas the upper branch corresponds to
maximal fluctuations σW for a given value of
the growth rate 〈W 〉.
For the lower branch, there are two regions
where 〈W 〉 is either positive or negative. In
the former case, the front is convex and can
be recovered by the maximization of the utility
function J = J1 defined in Eq. (4). In contrast,
in the negative 〈W 〉 region, the front is concave
and a different strategy is needed. Following
[24], we use a quadratic objective function
J2 = −(〈W 〉 −W0)2 − kσW . (11)
We use a global minus sign in order to keep
the same maximization procedure, although we
wish in fact to minimize both the value of σW
and the distance to a target value W0 for the
growth rate. By varying the target value W0
from 0 to a sufficiently negative value we can
draw the negative lower branch. Parameter k
weighs the importance between the constraint of
〈W 〉 being close to W0 or minimizing the value
of the fluctuations. We took k = 0.5 although
other moderate values would do.
Similarly, the upper branch with positive
〈W 〉 is concave and corresponds to the maxi-
mization of the objective function
J3 = α〈W 〉+ (1− α)σW , (12)
where the plus sign before σW now ensures the
maximization of the fluctuations in contrast
with the lower branch case. The upper branch
with negative 〈W 〉 appears almost straight for
large negative values of 〈W 〉. Thus, although
J3 could still be used there, further numerical
precision can be achieved by using a modified
objective function
J4 = −(〈W 〉 −W0)2 + kσW , (13)
where again the plus sign in front of σW cor-
responds to the maximization of fluctuations.
General conclusions can also be obtained
for this model near special points. Near Kelly’s
Figure 3: Pareto borders for 3 horses obtained
from numerical optimization of the utility func-
tions J1, J2, J3 and J4 (colored solid lines),
together with a cloud of points generated by
randomly choosing bets satisfying all relevant
constraints. Parameters are p1 = 0.2, p2 = 0.6,
r1 = 0.4 and r2 = 0.2 for the first two horses.
Inset: J1 versus γ along the trade-off branch
(i.e. on the dark blue border).
point, we find that the slope of the Pareto border
is always vertical. This means that in practice if
one is willing to pay a sacrifice a small amount of
the average growth rate, one can lower the fluc-
tuations significantly, thereby accessing "safer”
strategies such as the blue curves in Fig. 1.
Near the null strategy, we find a similar phase
transition as in the two horses case, which we
now analyze in more details.
VI. MEAN-VARIANCE TRADE-OFF :
BOUNDS
We recall that rx := 1/ox and we assume
a fair game for which
∑
x rx = 1. Then let
qx := rx/px, so that the first two moments of
q are 〈q〉 = 1 and σ2q := 〈q2〉 − 〈q〉2 = 〈q2〉 − 1.
Let us focus on the branch of positive 〈W 〉. In
this case, we find the following inequality,
σW ≥ 〈W 〉
σq
, (14)
which has a similar structure as the uncertainty
relations [15, 16], and which captures a general
trade-off between the mean and the variance of
the growth rate.
The proof goes as follows : we consider the
quantity σ2qσ2W , since σ2q = 〈q2〉 − 1, we have
5using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
σ2qσ
2
W = 〈(q − 1)2〉〈(W − 〈W 〉)2〉,
≥ 〈(q − 1)(W − 〈W 〉)〉2;
≥ (〈qW 〉 − 〈W 〉)2 , (15)
Now since 〈qW 〉 = −D(r|b) ≤ 0, when 〈W 〉 ≥ 0
D(r|b) + 〈W 〉 ≥ 〈W 〉. (16)
Using this bound into Eq. 15, the inequality Eq.
14 follows. This inequality is saturated when
bx = rx, which corresponds to the null strategy.
Similar inequalities can be derived using
instead other relevant Kullback-Leibler diver-
gences, such as D(b|p) or D(r|p). To exploit
the first divergence, we introduce the ratio
sx = bx/px which is also a normalized prob-
ability distribution similar to q, with a second
moment σ2s . Then, following the same steps, we
obtain an inequality for the quantity I intro-
duced in Eq (3) :
σI ≥ 〈I〉
σs
, (17)
which is saturated when bx = px, i.e. for Kelly’s
strategy. To exploit the second divergence, we
now use the quantity W˜ , and we obtain the
inequality
σW˜ ≥
〈W˜ 〉
σq
, (18)
which is saturated when px = rx. Note that
Eqs. 17 and 18 represent new bounds which
complement the second-law like bounds 〈I〉 ≥ 0
and 〈W˜ 〉 ≥ 0, similar to the ones provided by
uncertainty relations.
VII. PHASE TRANSITION IN
OPTIMAL STRATEGIES
In order to prove that there are no tighter
bounds of this type, we carry out a perturba-
tion calculation near the null strategy using the
vector x
oxbx =
bx
rx
= 1 + εx. (19)
To ensure that ~b is still a probability measure,
we require that the column vector ~ε = (εx)x lies
on the hyperplane (~r, ~ε) =
∑
x rxεx = 0.
By evaluating 〈W 〉 and σW to first order
in ~ε, we find that σW ∼ 〈W 〉/γc, with
γc = σq, (20)
an expression which we can be checked by plot-
ting a zoom of the Pareto border near the null
strategy [26]. The evaluation of the second or-
der derivative at the null strategy on the Pareto
border requires a calculation to second order in
~ε, which gives
d2σW
d〈W 〉2
∣∣∣∣
γ=γc
= C
γ5c
, (21)
where C = 〈q3〉−〈q2〉2 [26]. By Cauchy-Schwarz
again, it follows that 〈q2〉2 = 〈q3/2q1/2〉2 ≤ 〈q3〉,
thus C ≥ 0, with equality iff px = rx.
In the particular case of two horses, it is
straightforward to check that the expression of
γc given in Eq. (9) and that of the second deriva-
tive in Eq. (B13) are recovered from Eqs. (B9)-
(D14). These calculations show that there is
always a phase transition in this model near the
null strategy for an arbitrary number of horses
in the region of positive 〈W 〉. A similar calcula-
tion shows that the slope has the opposite value
on the other side in the region of negative 〈W 〉.
VIII. SHAPE OF THE FRONT :
GENERAL RESULTS
A. Large negative growth rate
In the regions of the phase diagram corre-
sponding to negative values of 〈W 〉, the Pareto
front is open. Namely, the growth rate di-
verges because it is evaluated on some bx → 0.
Easy computations shows that points in the
(〈W 〉, σW ) plane satisfy asymptotically 〈W 〉 →
−∞ and σW /〈W 〉 → −
√
(1− P ′)/P ′ when
bets bx′ → 0 for x′ ∈ X ′ with P ′ :=
∑
x′∈X′ px′ .
The smallest slope (lower front), is obtained
by putting all the bets on the horse x∗ which
has the least chances to win; this is the worst
strategy.
B. Lower front : positive growth rate
In order to decide whether other phase tran-
sitions are possible in this model, we now study
the convexity of the front near any point. More
precisely, we define the front as the extremum
locus of the functional
J˜m∗(b;λ, µ) := 〈W 2〉+ λ(〈W 〉 −m∗)
+ 2µ(
∑
x bx − 1), (22)
6where λ, µ are Lagrange multipliers fixing 〈W 〉
and implementing the bet normalization con-
straint. The procedure is equivalent to extrem-
izing the variance for a given average value m∗.
The null gradient condition DJ˜m∗(b;λ, µ) = 0
defines (b, λ, µ) as an implicit function f(m∗) of
m∗. The gradient of f , which is the Hessian of
J˜m∗ , may be inverted with some efforts, yield-
ing by the implicit function theorem the slope
dσW /d〈W 〉 = dσW /dm∗ and then finally, the
second derivative d2σW /d〈W 〉2 in terms of µ
(proportional to the inverse of the Pareto slope
parameter γ) and averaged functionals of bx/px.
Explicit formulas given in Supp. Mat [26] have
been checked numerically. One can then prove in
whole generality that the part of the lower front
between the null strategy and Kelly’s strategy
is convex, turning to concave in some neighbor-
hood of the null strategy when 〈W 〉 < 0, and
some neighborhood of Kelly’s strategy on the
upper front, as confirmed numerically in Fig. 2
and Fig. 3 in the case of two and three horses.
Note that this calculation does not exclude the
possibility of other phase transitions in other
parts of the front.
IX. CORRELATED RACES
As a variation on Kelly’s horse races, we
now assume that the races are no longer in-
dependent but follow from an ergodic Markov
process defined by the conditional probability
px|y, which represents the probability that the
horse x wins if the previous horse that won the
race was horse y. Let the bets be also condi-
tional and defined by bx|y such that
∑
x bx|y = 1.
The odds denoted by ox = 1/rx are assumed
to be fair
∑
x rx = 1. The average growth rate〈W 〉 now takes the following form
〈W 〉 = lim
N→∞
〈WN 〉 =
∑
x,y
px|yp¯y ln(bx|yox),
(23)
where p¯y denote the unique steady state prob-
ability of the races. By optimizing 〈W 〉 with
respect to bx|y, we find that the optimal strategy
is still proportional betting with now px|y = bx|y.
This is the new Kelly’s strategy for this case.
On the trade-off branch, the relevant utility
function is
J = α〈W 〉 − (1−α)σW +
∑
y
λy
∑
x
bx|y, (24)
where λy are Lagrange multipliers associated
to the normalization of the bets. The Pareto
borders are shown in Fig. 4. We observe nu-
merically that when correlations are present the
upper front for negative W becomes convex in
some intermediate region. In that region, the
border can not longer be described by J3 and
the use of J4 is unavoidable.
The null strategy corresponds to the condi-
tion that for any x, y, bx|y = rx, in which case
both the average growth rate and its variance
are zero. An expansion with respect to that
strategy can be carried as before. The q distri-
bution is now defined as qx|y = rx/px|y, which
is a probability distribution because
〈q〉 =
∑
xy
px|yp¯y
rx
px|y
=
∑
xy
p¯yrx = 1. (25)
Its second moment is now 〈q2〉 = ∑xy px|yp¯yq2x|y.
Except for this modification, the critical γ takes
the same form as in Eq. (B9), which is numeri-
cally tested in the inset of Fig. 4.
An inequality similar to Eq. (14) can also
be obtained in the case of correlated races be-
cause in this case the conditional bets bx|y are
still a probability distribution
∑
x bx|y = 1, and
therefore following the same steps, the positivity
of D(r|b) leads to a similar result. In fact, the
normalization of q is equivalent to a fluctuation
relation generalizing Eq. (3)[20]. because in
that case
〈e−W 〉 =
∑
xy
px|yp¯y
1
px|yox
= 1, (26)
while
〈e−W−I〉 = Λ, (27)
holds in the general case for an arbitrary strat-
egy with Ix|y = ln(px|y/bx|y).
X. CONCLUSION
Inspired by the link between information
theory and Kelly’s strategy, we have derived gen-
eral Fluctuation Relations and a set of inequali-
ties similar to uncertainty relations, which estab-
lish new links between gambling and Stochastic
Thermodynamics. We also revisited the classic
trade-off between average return and risk, which
plays a central role in money investement strate-
gies [3, 27], and found a detailed risk-return
tradeoff encoded in the Pareto front as well
as a saturating bound for this tradeoff in the
form of an uncertainty relation. While a similar
concept exists in Gaussian models of portfolios
management, there are important differences:
7Figure 4: Same plot as in fig. 3 but for the case
of for 3 horses in the presence of correlations
between the races. Parameters are detailed in
Ref. [26]. Inset: zoom near the null strategy
together with predictions from linear approxi-
mation.
first our utility function is not Gaussian un-
like what is usually assumed in these models,
secondly this utility function does not rely on
mean-field approximations, which are typically
only applicable for an infinite number of agents
or assets. We have identified a phase transition
between the null strategy and a mixed strategy,
a result which is beyond what can typically be
obtained from uncertainty relations and we have
shown that there is no other phase transition
between the null strategy and Kelly’s point due
to the convexity of the lower front. We have
also illustrated how to handle non-convex util-
ity functions, an important issue which is often
minimized in applications of machine learning.
The explicit analytical expressions which
we have obtained for the slope and curvature of
the front at any point could be used to move
directly along the front, as an alternative to
the involved optimization algorithm used here.
It would be also interesting to explore more
systematically how additional constraints affect
the efficient border. The question of adaptative
optimization of the bets, where possible non-
Markovian or non-ergodic features could arise,
is a rich inference problem worth pursuing [10].
Finally, we hope that this framework could open
news research directions on evolutionary trade-
offs and Pareto optimality in biology [5, 6].
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Supplementary Material
Appendix A: Notations.
Let rx := 1/ox, Wx := ln(oxbx) = ln(bx/rx) , qx := rxpx . Denote by 〈 · 〉 the average of a
function f = (fx)x with respect to the weights (px)x, 〈f〉 :=
∑
x pxfx. Then the average growth
rate is
〈W 〉 =
∑
x
px ln(bx/rx), (A1)
and the standard deviation of a given strategy ~b = (bx)x is
σW :=
√
〈W 〉2 − 〈W 〉2
=
√∑
x
px ln2(bx/rx)− 〈W 〉2. (A2)
By hypothesis, the column vectors ~p = (px)x, ~r = (rx)x and ~b = (bx)x are probability distributions,∑
x px =
∑
x rx =
∑
x bx = 1. Furthermore, the two first moments of q are
〈q〉 = 1, σ2q := 〈q2〉 − 〈q〉2 = 〈q2〉 − 1. (A3)
Appendix B: Solution for two horses
Let the probability that the first horse wins (resp. loses) be p (resp. 1−p); the bet and the odd
on the first (resp. second) horse are b and 1/r (resp. 1− b and 1/(1− r)) and let us introduce the
parameter σ =
√
p(1− p). In this way, the odds are fair. Let also γ := 1−αα and σ :=
√
p(1− p).
Then
〈W 〉 = p ln( b
r
) + (1− p) ln( 1− b1− r ), (B1)
and
σ2W = p(1− p) ln2
b(1− r)
(1− b)r =
(
σ ln b(1− r)(1− b)r
)2
. (B2)
From the optimization of the utility function J defined in the main text, we obtain the optimal
strategy b± :
b± = p± γσ, (B3)
where the + (resp. −) sign corresponds to an overbetting (resp. underbetting) strategy with respect
to Kelly’s strategy where b = p. As shown in Fig. 2 of main text, these two solutions form the two
9branches of the efficient border which meet at Kelly’s point. When p < r the lower blue solid line
is the tradeoff branch associated with b+, while the upper red solid line is the non-tradeoff branch,
associated with b−. The roles of b− and b+ exchange when instead p > r. Let us first focus on the
region where 〈W 〉 ≥ 0 and let us assume e.g. p > r, in which case
b = p− γσ. (B4)
Using Eqs. B1-B2, we find
d〈W 〉
db
= p− b
b(1− b) =
γσ
b(1− b) , (B5)
and
1
2
d(σ2W )
db
= σ
2
b(1− b) ln(
b(1− r)
(1− b)r ). (B6)
Hence by taking the ratio of Eq. (B6) and (B5),
1
2
d(σ2W )
d〈W 〉 =
σ
γ
ln(b(1− r)(1− b)r ) =
σW
γ
> 0. (B7)
Using the definition of γ, we deduce that the slope of the Pareto border is
dσW
d〈W 〉
∣∣∣∣
γ
= σ
p− b , (B8)
where b is equal to b− since we have assumed r < p. This equation shows that the slope becomes
infinite at Kelly’s point where γ → 0 and b− → p; while it reaches a finite value near the null
strategy, namely
dσW
d〈W 〉
∣∣∣∣
γc
= 1
γc
= σ
p− r . (B9)
This suggests that there is a phase transition between the null strategy and a mixed strategy at
this critical value γc. To confirm this point, we need to check that the border is convex near the
null strategy.
To do so, we take the derivative of Eq. B7 with respect to 〈W 〉 as before :
1
2
d2(σ2W )
d〈W 〉2 =
σ
γ
d
db ln(
b
1−b ) +
σW
σγ2
d〈W 〉/db =
1
γ2
+ b(1− b) σW
σ2γ3
; (B10)
Finally, using the general formula
(
√
f)′′ = 1
2
√
f
f ′′ − 14f
−3/2(f ′)2, (B11)
we find the simple result
d2σW
d〈W 〉2 =
b(1− b)
σ2γ3
, (B12)
which is always positive, in particular near the null strategy where it takes the value
d2σW
d〈W 〉2
∣∣∣∣
γ=γc
= r(1− r)
σ2γ3c
> 0. (B13)
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Appendix C: General expansion near the null strategy to first order
Let us now analyze the general case for an arbitrary number of horses. As already observed for
the two horses case, the lower and upper branch correspond to different optimization problems.
The lower branch is formed by bets that maximize the growth rate 〈W 〉 with the minimal average
fluctuations σW whereas the upper branch corresponds to maximal fluctuations σW for a given value
of the growth rate 〈W 〉. For the lower branch, there are two regions where 〈W 〉 is either positive or
negative. In the former case, the front is convex and can be recovered by the maximization of the
utility function J = J1 defined in the main text.
General conclusions can be obtained for this model near special points. Near Kelly’s point, we
find that the slope of the Pareto border is always vertical. To prove this, we rely on perturbation
calculations near these specific strategies. In this case, we find that the first order correction to
〈W 〉 vanishes, while that of σW does not vanish. It follows from this that the slope of the border
(〈W 〉, σW ) is indeed vertical near Kelly’s point.
We now detail the expansion near the null strategy, where we find a similar phase transition as
found in the two horses case. Let us introduce the vector x to measure the distance to the null
strategy as
oxbx =
bx
rx
= 1 + εx. (C1)
To ensure that ~b is still a probability measure, we require that the column vector ~ε = (εx)x lies on
the hyperplane (~r, ~ε) =
∑
x rxεx = 0.
By evaluating 〈W 〉 and σW , we find that
〈W 〉 ∼ 〈ε〉 − 12 〈ε
2〉, (C2)
and
σ2W ∼ 〈ε2〉 − 〈ε〉2. (C3)
To leading order in ε or in σW , the equation for the optimal bets, namely Eq. (8) of the main text
yields
εx − 〈ε〉 ∼ σW
γ
(1− qx) (C4)
Multiplying (C4) by rx and summing over x to eliminate εx yields
〈ε〉 ∼ σW
γ
(〈q2〉 − 1) (C5)
But we can also use Eq. C4 to obtain to leading order in ε,
〈ε2〉 − 〈ε〉2 ∼ σ
2
W
γ2
σ2q . (C6)
Combining these two equations, we obtain the slope on the tradeoff branch near the null strategy
σW ∼ 〈W 〉
γc
= 〈W 〉
σq
. (C7)
Appendix D: General expansion near the null strategy to second order
Before embarking on the evaluation of the second order derivative near the null strategy on
the Pareto border, it is useful to formalize the general problem of minimization of the variance, not
necessarily near the null strategy. In general the minimization of the variance leads to the optimal
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bet b∗ = b(m) parametrized by a given value of the average, 〈W 〉 = m. Below, we focus on the case
where m ≥ 0. The following parametrization of the bets is then appropriate to explore the space of
parameters b around b(m) :
bx
rx
= b
∗
x
rx
+ εx, (D1)
coinciding with (C1) when b∗ = r is the null strategy. To simplify the notation, we will drop the
subscript with the star on the bx and on m, since it will be implicit that we consider this optimal
solution.
Taking into account the constraints 〈W 〉 = m and (~r, ~ε) = 0, this is equivalent to minimizing
the functional −J˜m (equivalent to maximizing J˜m)
−J˜m(ε;λ, µ) := 〈W 2〉+ λ(〈W 〉 −m) + 2µ(~r, ~ε). (D2)
Thus, we require the null gradient condition ∇˜J˜m = 0, where ∇˜ :=
 ∇∂λ
∂µ
, and ∇ = (∂εx)x.
The general formula for minimization with constraints may be found in standard textbooks,
implying positivity of H = −∇2J˜m = ∇2〈W 2〉+ λ∇2(〈W 〉−m) + 2µ∇2(~r, ~ε). Computations yields
for the null gradient condition,
−12∇J˜m =
{
ln(bx/rx) +
λ
2
}rx
bx
px + µrx = 0. (D3)
After multiplying Eq. (D3) by bx/rx and summing over x, one obtains
−λ2 = m+ µ (D4)
Thus b = b(m) is given by two conditions:{
ln
(
bx
rx
)
+ µ
(
bx
px
− 1
)
= m∑
x bx = 1
(D5)
The r.-h. s. of the first line of (D5), a constant, is fixed by averaging, yielding the trivial relation
〈W 〉 = m, whence the need for an extra condition given by the second line, which defines a function
µ(m). By comparing Eq. D5 with the equation for the optimal bets given in Eq. 8 of the main
text, we obtain the general expression :
µ = σW
γ
. (D6)
On the Pareto front, the differential of J˜ defined in Eq. 6 of the main text must vanish. This leads
to the condition d〈W 〉 − γdσW = 0, which means that dσW /dm = 1/γ. Then, using Eq. D6, we
obtain the equally general result
µ = 12
dσ2W
dm
. (D7)
Let us now focus on the expansion near the null strategy. We already now from the expression
for the slope of the border derived in the previous section, namely Eq. C7, that dσWdm →m→0 1σq .
Let us further assume that d
2σW
dm2 →m→0 C˜ where C˜ or equivalently C given by C ≡ σ5q C˜ is an
unknown coefficient to be determined self-consistently which controls the curvature of the border
near the null strategy.
Now using Eq. D7,
dµ
dm
= 12
d2σ2W
dm2
= (dσW
dm
)2 + σW
d2σW
dm2
∼ ( 1
σq
+mC˜)2 + C˜m/σq ∼ 1
σ2q
+ 3 C˜
σq
m. (D8)
12
Since to dominant order, m ∼ σ2qµ, we have
m ∼ σ2qµ(1−
3
2 C˜σ
3
qµ), (D9)
We now evaluate εx to second order, using bx/rx = 1 + εx in Eq. D5. This yields :
εx − ε
2
x
2 + µ[
rx
px
(1 + εx)− 1] ∼ σ2qµ(1−
3
2 C˜σ
3
qµ). (D10)
Thus εx ∼ (1 + σ2q − rxpx )µ+O(µ2) to dominant order, which gives
εx ∼ (1 + σ2q −
rx
px
)µ+ ε
2
x
2 − µ
rx
px
εx − 32 C˜σ
5
qµ
2
∼ (1 + σ2q −
rx
px
)µ+
{1
2(1 + σ
2
q −
rx
px
)(1 + σ2q − 3
rx
px
)− 32C
}
µ2 +O(µ3). (D11)
This expansion must be consistent with the condition
∑
x rxεx = 0. Using the above formula,
one finds that the first order term vanishes, and the second order term vanishes only if and only if
1
2 〈 (1 + σ
2
q −
rx
px
)(1 + σ2q − 3
rx
px
) rx
px
〉 = 32C, (D12)
which means that 3C = (1 + σ2q )2 − 4(1 + σ2q )〈q2〉+ 3〈q3〉, or
C = 〈q3〉 − (1 + σ2q )2 = 〈q3〉 − (〈q2〉)2. (C) (D13)
Therefore, we have shown that the second derivative is
d2σW
d2〈W 〉
∣∣∣∣
γ=γc
= C
γ5c
. (D14)
Note that the positivity of second derivative is guaranteed in the general. Indeed using Cauchy-
Schwarz, 〈q2〉2 ≤ 〈q3〉, which shows that C ≥ 0, with equality iff r1/2x ∝ r
3/2
x
px
, i.e. when px = rx.
In the end, we obtain the following second order approximation of the Pareto border near the
null strategy
σW ∼ 1
γc
〈W 〉+ C2γ5c
〈W 〉2. (D15)
In the particular case of two horses, it is straightforward to check that the expression of γc
given in Eq. B9 and that of the second derivative in Eq. B13 are recovered from Eq. B9 and
Eq. D14 because of the following relations :
σ2q =
r2
p
+ (1− r)
2
1− p − 1 =
(r − p)2
σ2
, (D16)
and
C = −σ4q + 〈(q − 1)3〉+ σ2q = −
(p− r)4
σ4
+ (p− r)
3
σ4
(2p− 1) + (p− r)
2
σ2
= (p− r)
2
σ4
{
− (p− r)2 + (p− r)(2p− 1) + p(1− p)
}
= (p− r)
2
σ4
r(1− r), (D17)
therefore
C
γ5c
= r(1− r)
γ3cσ
2 , (D18)
as expected.
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Appendix E: General mathematical results for the shape of the border
We prove in this section the general results stated p.4 and 5 of Main text.
V. 1. Large negative values of growth rate.
Let ∅ ( X ′ ( X. Assume bx → 0 when x ∈ X ′, while all other parameters (bx)x 6∈X′ are kept fixed.
Eq. (D5),
ln( bx
rx
) + µ bx
px
= m+ µ independent from x (E1)
implies that ln(bx/rx) ∼ m+µ independently of x for all x ∈ X ′; thus the speed of convergence of bx
to 0 for x ∈ X ′ may be characterized by a single parameter ε→ 0+ defined by −1/ε = ln(bx′/rx′),
x′ being an arbitrary element of X ′; for all x ∈ X ′, ln(bx/rx) ∼ −1/ε. Hence a first relation, where
0 < P ′ :=
∑
x∈X′ px < 1,
(1) m =
∑
x
px ln(bx/rx) ∼
∑
x∈X′
px ln(bx/rx) ∼ε→0 −P ′/ε
Now, −1/ε ∼ m+ µ, hence a second relation,
(2) m ∼ε→0 P ′(m+ µ).
From (1) and (2), we deduce µ ∼ε→0 −(1− P ′)/ε.
Similarly,
σ2W =
∑
x
px ln2(bx/rx) − m2 ∼ P ′/ε2 −m2 = P ′(1− P ′)/ε2 (E2)
whence a P ′-dependent asymptote for the front,
σW
|m| −→ε→0
√
1− P ′
P ′
. (E3)
This is in whole coherence with the two-horse case analyzed p.3. This gives a set of asymptotes with
slopes
{√
1−P ′(X′)
P ′(X′)
}
, where P ′(X ′) :=
∑
x∈X′ px, and X ′ ranges in the set of non trivial subsets
of X. Note that the function P ′ 7→
√
1−P ′
P ′ is decreasing, so the largest slope (highest asymptote)
is
√
1−pmin
pmin
, with pmin := minx∈X px (say, pmin = px∗ for some x∗ ∈ X), while the smallest slope
(lowest asymptote) is the inverse quantity,
√
pmin
1−pmin , obtained by choosing X
′ = X \ {x∗} – clearly,
the worst possible strategy, since all bets are set on the worst horse – .
V. 2. Convexity of the lower front. The remainder of the section is devoted to the computation
of the second derivative of the border d
2σW
d〈W 〉2 . We introduce the functional
J˜m∗(b;λ, µ) := 〈W 2〉+ λ(〈W 〉 −m∗) + 2µ(
∑
x
bx − 1), (E4)
where λ, µ are Lagrange multipliers fixing 〈W 〉 and implementing the bet normalization constraint.
Conditions ∂J˜m∗∂λ = 0,
∂J˜m∗
∂µ = 0 fix the average growth rate 〈W 〉 to the value m∗, and impose the
constraint
∑
x bx = 1. Conditions
∂J˜m∗
∂bx
= 0 then give the local extrema of σW for fixed 〈W 〉 since
σ2W = 〈W 2〉 − (m∗)2. Depending on the eigenvalues of the Hessian D2J˜m∗ , one may in principle
select local maxima or minma; in practice this is however complicated due to the constraints.
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Theorem 1 Let us introduce the vectors
ax :=
1
2(∇
2J˜m)xx = px(
rx
bx
)2
(
1− λ2 − ln(bx/rx)
)
(E5)
and ux = px rxbx and vx = 2rx so that ax =
ux
px
(ux + µ2 vx). Then,
d2σW
d〈W 〉2 =
4µ
σ2Wdet
2
a(u; v)
×
×
{σ2W
µ2
[
(1− 12(u, v)a)−
µ
4 det
2
a(u; v)
]
− µ4 det
2
a(u; v)
}
(E6)
where (·, ·)a, det2a(·, ·) refer to the (not necessarily positive-definite) "pseudo-metric" gxy =
a−1x δx,y on R|X|, namely,
(u, v)a =
∑
x
a−1x uxvx, |u|2a = (u, u)a, |v|2a = (v, v)a, det2a(u, v) = |u|2a|v|2a − (u, v)2a. (E7)
The above analytical formula is implicit, since (b, λ, µ) are functions of 〈W 〉. Furthermore, it
implies the following result:
Theorem 2 (i) The part of the lower front (see section 3) – i.e. of the variance-minimizing
curve – with 〈W 〉 > 0 is strictly convex, i.e. d2σWdm2 > 0.
(ii) In some neighborhood of the null strategy on the left lower front defined by 〈W 〉 < 0, and in
some neighborhood of Kelly’s strategy on the upper front, the front is concave, i.e. satisfies
d2σW
dm2 < 0.
V. 2. 1. Proof of Theorem 1.
Let us start from (b = (bx)x∈X = b∗, λ = λ∗, µ = µ∗;m = m∗) such that f(b, λ, µ;m) ≡
DJ˜m∗ = 0. The gradient of f w.r. to (b, λ, µ), which is the Hessian D2J˜m, is (as proved below)
invertible. The implicit function theorem then implies that the locus {f = 0} is given locally around
(b∗, λ∗, µ∗;m∗) by functions b = b(m), λ = λ(m), µ = µ(m) such that
dbx
dm
= −
(
(∇˜f)−1 ∂f
∂m
)
x
,
dλ
dm
= −
(
(∇˜f)−1 ∂f
∂m
)
λ
,
dµ
dm
= −
(
(∇˜f)−1 ∂f
∂m
)
µ
(E8)
In subsequent computations, we use rescaled variables εx = bx−b
∗
x
rx
instead of b. The notation (..)x
denotes the component along ε = (εx)x∈X of the gradient. The condition
∑
x
bx
rx
∇J˜m = 0 yields
−λ2 = m∗ + µ, which implies in turn the equations
ln(bx/rx) + µ(
bx
px
− 1) = m, (E9)
which are equivalent to (6) (see Main text) if one sets µ = σW /γ.
A. 1. Computation of the inverse of the Hessian.
∇˜f =

∇2J˜m ∂λ∇J˜ ∂µ∇J˜(
∂λ∇J˜
)t
∂2λJ˜m ∂
2
λµJ˜m(
∂µ∇J˜
)t
∂2λµJ˜m ∂
2
µJ˜m
 = ( A BBt 0
)
(E10)
where
A = ∇2J˜m = (∇2xyJ˜m)xy, B = (∂λ∇J˜ ∂µ∇J˜) (E11)
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are |X| × |X|, resp. |X| × 2 matrices, and A = At is symmetric. The inverse of the matrix ∇˜f is,
as follows from a simple computation,
(∇˜f)−1 =
A−1
(
I −B(A−1BC−1)t
)
A−1BC−1(
(A−1)BC−1
)t
−C−1
 (E12)
where C = BtA−1B is a symmetric 2× 2 matrix. Some elementary algebra yields in block form
(∇˜f)−1 = 1
det2a(u; v)
 12 (det2a(u; v) diag(a−1)− Z) |v|2a
−−−→
a−1u− (u, v)a
−−−→
a−1v |u|2a
−−−→
a−1v − (u, v)a
−−−→
a−1u
|v|2a
(
a−1u
)t − (u, v)a(a−1v)t −2|v|2a 2(u, v)a
|u|2a
(
a−1v
)t − (u, v)a(a−1u)t 2(u, v)a −2|u|2a

(E13)
Note that ux ∼ ax ∼ px in the neighborhood of the null strategy, so that (rescaling vectors
c, d ∈ R|X| by the probability weights px, (pc)x := pxcx, (pd)x := pxdx) (pc, pd)a ∼
∑
x pxcxdx boils
down to the usual L2-metric weighted by p in that limit. In the equation above, we have denoted
Z the following symmetric |X| × |X|-matrix,
Z := |v|2a (a−1u⊗ a−1u) + |u|2a (a−1v ⊗ a−1v)− (u, v)a
{
(a−1u⊗ a−1v) + (a−1v ⊗ a−1u)
}
(E14)
Then
−−−→
a−1u is a vector in R|X|, (a−1u)x = a−1x ux, with transpose (a−1u)t.
A. 2. We easily derive from the inverse Hessian formula the first derivative of the Pareto border.
We find first
1
2
dσ2W
dm
= 12
d〈W 2〉
dm
−m = 12
∑
x
dεx
dm
∂〈W 2〉
∂εx
− m (E15)
since 〈W 2〉 is independent of λ, µ and does not depend explicitly on m
=
∑
x
px
rx
bx
ln(bx/rx)
(
− (∇˜f)−1 ∂f
∂m
)
x
−m =
∑
x
px
rx
bx
ln(bx/rx)
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
x
−m.
(E16)
Then
1
2
dσ2W
dm
= −m+
∑
x
px
rx
bx
ln(bx/rx)
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
x
= −m+ 1
det2a(u; v)
∑
x
(
mux − µ2 (vx − 2ux)
)(
|v|2a
ux
ax
− (u, v)a vx
ax
)
= 1
det2a(u; v)
µ
(
|v|2a
∑
x
ux
ax
− (2− µ2 |v|
2
a)
∑
x
vx
ax
)
= µ (E17)
The result is coherent with the slope formula dσW /d〈W 〉 = 1/γ, if one sets µ = σW /γ.
A. 3. Exploration of the front: a possible application of the inverse Hessian formula. Formula (E8),
completed by the expression (E13) for (∇˜f)−1, allows a numerical exploration of the front starting
from an arbitrary point. This provides an elementary alternative to the numerical exploration
process described in Main Text.
B. 1. Second derivative. Preliminary results. We must differentiate once more to obtain
d2σ2W /d〈W 〉2 = d2σ2W /dm2. This is straightforward in principle using the explicit expression
for (∇˜f)−1, but in practice, computations are rather involved.
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Differentiating (E15) once again, one finds
1 + 12
d2(σ2W )
dm2
≡ D21 +D22 +D23, (E18)
with
D21 :=
1
2
∑
x
(
dεx
dm
)2
∂2(〈w2〉)
∂ε2x
=
∑
x
a0x
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)2
x
(E19)
where
a0x :=
1
2px
d2
dε2
ln2( bx
rx
+ ε)
∣∣∣
ε=0
= px(
rx
bx
)2(1− ln(bx/rx)) = ux
px
{
(1−m− µ)ux + µ2 vx
}
; (E20)
D22 :=
1
2
dλ
dm
∑
x
∂〈w〉2
∂εx
∂
∂λ
(
dεx
dm
)
=
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
λ
∑
x
px
rx
bx
ln( bx
rx
) ∂
∂λ
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
x
(E21)
D23 :=
1
2
∑
x,y
∂〈w2〉
∂εx
dεy
dm
∂
∂εy
(
dεx
dm
)
=
∑
x
px
rx
bx
ln( bx
rx
)
∑
y
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
y
∂
∂εy
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
x
. (E22)
Upon computing these quantities for (ε, λ, µ;m) = (0, λ(m), µ(m);m), we can use (D5) and replace
in the sum ln(bx/rx) by m− µ( bxpx − 1).
The only coefficients of the inverse Hessian that we need are
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
x
= 1
det2a(u; v)
(
|v|2a
ux
ax
− (u, v)a vx
ax
)
. (E23)
and
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
λ
= − 2|v|
2
a
det2a(u; v)
. (E24)
B. 2. Remarkable identities Computations for the second derivative involve the following sums,
Ii,j =
∑
x a
−1
x u
i
xv
j
x (i+ j = 2), Ii,j =
∑
x a
−1
x
uixv
j
x
pxax
(i + j = 4), Ii,j =
∑
x a
−1
x
uixv
j
x
(pxax)2 (i+ j = 6).
The explicit expressions for a in terms of u, v, together with the normalization condition
∑
x px =∑
x bx = 1, yield a set of remarkable identities giving a triangular structure,
I4,0 +
µ
2 I3,1 = |u|
2
a,
µ
2 I2,2 + I3,1 = (u, v)a, I2,2 +
µ
2 I1,3 = |v|
2
a
and
I6,0 +
µ
2 I5,1 = I4,0, I5,1 +
µ
2 I4,2 = I3,1,
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I4,2 +
µ
2 I3,3 = I2,2, I3,3 +
µ
2 I2,4 = I1,3
The more elementary identities
|u|2a +
µ
2 (u, v)a = 1,
µ
2 |v|
2
a + (u, v)a = 2 (E25)
can be proven similarly, from which
det2a(u; v) = (1−
µ
2 (u, v)a)
2
µ
(2− (u, v)a)− (u, v)2a =
2
µ
(2− (µ+ 1)(u, v)a). (E26)
They imply after tedious computations:
D21 =
1
det4a(u; v)
{
(1−m− µ)
[
− 8
µ
I3,1 +
4
µ2
(
4− (4 + 2µ)(u, v)a + (1 + 2µ)(u, v)2a
)]
+µ2
[
− 8
µ
I2,2 − 8
µ2
(u, v)a((u, v)a − 2)
]}
. (E27)
B. 3. (computation of the second term D22). We prove that D22 = 0. Let M˜(λ) := ∇˜f =( M(λ) Cst
Cst Cst
)
; then
∂
∂λ
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
x
= −
(
M˜(λ)dM˜
dλ
M˜−1(λ)
 01
0
)
x
(E28)
=
(
(∇˜f)−1
( diag(px( rxbx )2) 0
0 0
)
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
x
= 1det2a(u;v)
(
(∇˜f)−1
( diag(u2xpx ) 0
0 0
)  |v|2a uxax − (u, v)a vxax−2|v|2a
2(u, v)a
)
x
= 1
det2a(u; v)
(
(∇˜f)−1
 wx0
0
)
x
= 1
2det4a(u; v)
(
(det2a(u; v)diag(a−1)− Z)w
)
x
, (E29)
where using the above remarkable identities,
wx :=
u2x
px
(|v|2a
ux
ax
−(u, v)a vx
ax
) = u
2
x
px
( 4
µ
ux
ax
−(u, v)a
vx + 2µux
ax
) = 1
pxax
{ 4
µ
u3x−(u, v)a(
2
µ
u3x+u2xvx)
}
.
(E30)
Computation of (Zw)-term. Z ≡ Z1 + Z2 − (Z3 + Zsym3 ), with Z1 := |v|2a(a−1u ⊗ a−1u), Z2 :=
|u|2a(a−1v⊗a−1v), Z3 := (u, v)a(a−1u⊗a−1v), Zsym3 := (u, v)a(a−1v⊗a−1u). Using the remarkable
identities, we get
(Z1w)x = |v|2a
ux
ax
{( 4
µ
− 2
µ
(u, v)a
)
I4,0 − (u, v)aI3,1
}
= |v|2a
ux
ax
{ 2
µ
|u|2a(2− (u, v)a)− 2I3,1
}
(E31)
(Z3w)x = (u, v)a
ux
ax
{ 2
µ
(2− (u, v)a)I3,1 − (u, v)aI2,2
}
= (u, v)a
ux
ax
2
µ
{
2I3,1 − (u, v)2a
}
(E32)
((Z1 − Z3)w)x = ux
ax
[
I3,1
{
− 2|v|2a −
4
µ
(u, v)a
}
+ ( 2
µ
)2(1− µ2 (u, v)a)(2− (u, v)a)
2 + 2
µ
(u, v)3a
]
= ux
ax
{
− 8
µ
I3,1 +
4
µ2
[
4− (4 + 2µ)(u, v)a + (1 + 2µ)(u, v)2a
]}
(E33)
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Similarly, (Z2w)x = |u|2a vxax 2µ
{
2I3,1 − (u, v)2a
}
(compare with (E32)); (Zsym3 w)x =
(u, v)a vxax
{
2
µ |u|2a(2 − (u, v)a) − 2I3,1
}
(compare with (E31)); ((Z2 − Zsym3 )w)x =
vx
ax
{
4
µI3,1 − 4µ |u|2a(u, v)a
}
. The contribution of the term in (Z1 − Z3)w to C2 :=
2det4a(u; v)
∑
x px
rx
bx
ln( bxrx )
∂
∂λ
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
x
is
∑
x
(mux − µ2 (vx − 2ux))
ux
ax
{
− 8
µ
I3,1 +
4
µ2
[4− (4 + 2µ)(u, v)a + (1 + 2µ) (u, v)2a]
}
= (m+ µ)|u|2a
{
− 8
µ
I3,1 +
4
µ2
[4− (4 + 2µ) (u, v)a + (1 + 2µ) (u, v)2a]
}
−µ2 (u, v)a
{
− 8
µ
I3,1 +
4
µ2
[4− (4 + 2µ) (u, v)a + (1 + 2µ) (u, v)2a]
}
(E34)
Similarly, the contribution of the term in (Z2 − Z3,sym)w to C2 is∑
x
(mux − µ2 (vx − 2ux))
vx
ax
{ 4
µ
I3,1 − 4
µ
|u|2a(u, v)a
}
= (m+ µ)(u, v)a
{ 4
µ
I3,1 − 4
µ
|u|2a(u, v)a
}
− µ2 |v|
2
a
{ 4
µ
I3,1 − 4
µ
|u|2a(u, v)a
}
(E35)
Contribution of the diagonal term. Finally, the contribution of the term in det2a(u; v)wxax to C2 is
det2a(u; v)
∑
x
(mux − µ2 (vx − 2ux))
1
pxa2x
{ 4
µ
u3x − (u, v)a(
2
µ
u3x + u2xvx)
}
= det2a(u; v)
{
(m+ µ)
[ 4
µ
(|u|2a −
µ
2 I3,1)−
2
µ
|u|2a(u, v)a
]
−µ2
[ 4
µ
I3,1 − 2
µ
(u, v)2a
]}
(E36)
Adding up the three terms (E34), (E35) and (E36), and using formula (E26) for det2a(u; v),
one gets zero after some extra work.
The partial derivative of (∇˜f)−1 w.r. to εy is computed as (compare with B.3.)
−(∇˜f)−1 ∂∇˜f∂εy (∇˜f)−1. Now,
( ∂
∂εy
A)xx =
∂
∂εy
[ 2px
( bxrx + εx)
2
(1− λ2 − ln(
bx
rx
+ εx))
]∣∣∣
ε=0
= −2δx,ypy(ry
by
)3(3−λ− 2 ln( by
ry
)) (E37)
Writing B = (B·,1 B·,2), with (B·,1)x = ( pxbx
rx
+εx
), (B·,2) = (2rx)x, we get ∇B·,2 = 0 and
( ∂
∂εy
B·,1)x
∣∣∣
ε=0
= −δx,ypy(ry
by
)2 (E38)
All together, all coefficients of ∂∂εy ∇˜f
∣∣∣
ε=0
vanish, except three of them,
αy :=
( ∂
∂εy
∇˜f
)
y,y
= −2py(ry
by
)3(3− λ− 2 ln( by
ry
)) = −4(uy
py
)2(32uy +
µ
2 vy) (E39)
and
βy :=
( ∂
∂εy
∇˜f
)
λ,y
=
( ∂
∂εy
∇˜f
)
y,λ
= −py(ry
by
)2 = −u
2
y
py
. (E40)
Then, successively,
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(i) the vector wy :=
(
∂
∂εy
∇˜f
)
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
 has only two non-vanishing coefficients,
(wy)y :=
(( ∂
∂εy
∇˜f
)
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
y
≡ 1
det2a(u; v)
γy, (E41)
γy := αy
(
|v|2a
uy
ay
− (u, v)a vy
ay
)
+ βy(−2|v|2a) (E42)
and
(wy)λ :=
(( ∂
∂εy
∇˜f
)
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
λ
= 1
det2a(u; v)
βy
(
|v|2a
uy
ay
− (u, v)a vy
ay
)
. (E43)
(ii) (non-diagonal coefficient) if x 6= y, then
−
(
(∇˜f)−1
( ∂
∂εy
∇˜f
)
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
x
= 1
det4a(u; v)
[1
2Zx,yγy −
(
|v|2a
ux
ax
− (u, v)a vx
ax
)
βy
(
|v|2a
uy
ay
− (u, v)a vy
ay
)]
(E44)
(iii) (diagonal coefficient) letting x = y, then
−
(
(∇˜f)−1
( ∂
∂εx
∇˜f
)
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
x
= 1
det4a(u; v)
[
− 12(det
2
a(u; v) a−1x − Zx,x)γx −
(
|v|2a
ux
ax
− (u, v)a vx
ax
)
βx
(
|v|2a
ux
ax
− (u, v)a vx
ax
)]
(E45)
We now split accordingly the third line of (E22),
D23 :=
∑
x
px
rx
bx
ln( bx
rx
)
∑
y
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
y
∂
∂εy
(
(∇˜f)−1
 01
0
)
x
. (E46)
into the sum of three contributions,
D23 ≡
1
det6a(u; v)
(
D23,β +D23,γ +D23,γ,diag
)
. (E47)
Note that, now that we are located on the front, we can use (D5) and replace in the sum
px
rx
bx
ln(bx/rx) by mux − µ2 (vx − 2ux) (as in A.2), while αy, βy are given by (E39), (E40).
By tedious computations, we find :
D23,β = −
∑
x,y
(mux − µ2 (vx − 2ux))
(
|v|2a
ux
ax
− (u, v)a vx
ax
)
βy
(
|v|2a
uy
ay
− (u, v)a vy
ay
)2
=
{∑
y
u2y
py
(
|v|2a
uy
ay
− (u, v)a vy
ay
)2} {
(m+ µ) det2a(u; v)
}
= (m+ µ)det2a(u; v) ×
4
µ2
{
(1 + 2µ) (u, v)2a − 2(2 + µ) (u, v)a + 4
}
− 8
µ
I3,1
(E48)
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Similar computations (which we choose to skip) yield D23,γ +D23,γ,diag = 0. All together, we
have found:
1 + 12
d2(σ2W )
dm2
= 1
det2a(u; v)
2
µ
(2− (u, v)a) (E49)
B. 5. (final formula). Finally, from this last formula, we obtain
σW
d2σW
dm2
= 12
d2(σ2W )
dm2
− 1
σ2W
(12
dσ2W
dm
)2 = (E49)− 1− µ
2
σ2W
(E50)
= 4/µ
det2a(u; v)
{
(1− 12(u, v)a)−
µ
4 det
2
a(u; v)(1 +
µ2
σ2W
)
}
≡ 4µ
σ2Wdet
2
a(u; v)
× D2, (E51)
where
D2 := det
2
a(u; v)
4 σ
3
W
d2σW
dm2
= σ
2
W
µ2
[
(1− 12(u, v)a)−
µ
4 det
2
a(u; v)
]
− µ4 det
2
a(u; v) (E52)
Ths implies, finally, Theorem 1.
V. 2. 2. Proof of Theorem 2.
1. General notations. For the proof, we first introduce new notations:
sx =
px
bx
, (E53)
so that ux = rxsx, and uxvx =
ux
2rx =
sx
2 ; recall
1
ax
= px
ux(ux+µ2 vx)
, a formula which connects scalar
products (·, ·)a to standard averages 〈 · 〉. Also, 〈 1s 〉 =
∑
x bx = 1. Finally, let
Lµ :=
1
µ
(
1− 〈 1
s+ µ 〉
)
, S := 〈 1
s2
〉 = d(µLµ)
dµ
∣∣
µ=0, C := 〈
1
s3
〉 = −12
d2(µLµ)
dµ2
∣∣
µ=0 (E54)
(S=square, C=cube). Then
σ2W
µ2
= 1
µ2
(
〈W 2〉 −m2) = 1
µ2
{
〈 (m− µ( bx
px
− 1))2 〉 −m2}
= 〈 ( bx
px
− 1)2 〉 = 〈 1
s2
〉 − 1 = S − 1 (E55)
1− 12(u, v)a = 1− 〈
1
s+ µ 〉 = µLµ, (E56)
1− 12(1 + µ)(u, v)a = 1− (1 + µ)〈
1
s+ µ 〉 =
µ
4 det
2
a(u; v) = µ
[
(1 + µ)Lµ − 1
]
, (E57)
hence d
2σW
dm2 has same sign as
1
4det
2
a(u; v)
D2
µ
=
{
(1 + µ)Lµ − 1
} {
(S − 1)Lµ − S((1 + µ)Lµ − 1)
}
=
{
(1 + µ)Lµ − 1
} {
S − (1 + Sµ)Lµ
}
(E58)
2. Main Lemma. The proof of Theorem 2 rests on the following
21
Lemma 1 1. Assume that µ > max
(
− 1,max{−sx, x ∈ X}
)
or
µ < min
(
− 1,min{−sx, x ∈ X}
)
. Then (1 + µ)Lµ − 1 > 0 .
2. Assume that µ > max
(
− 1/S,max{−sx, x ∈ X}
)
or
µ < min
(
− 1/S,min{−sx, x ∈ X}
)
. Then 〈 1+Sµs+µ 〉 > 1.
The conditions of the Lemma hold true in particular (i) if µ ≥ 0; (ii) if −1 µ < 0 (including
in particular the case of the part of the lower front with 〈w〉 < 0, as we shall see); (iii) if µ −1
(including in particular a neighborhood of Kelly’s strategy – where µ = −∞ – on the upper front).
Proof.
1. We first note that µ((1+µ)Lµ−1) = (1+µ)(1−〈 1s+µ 〉)−µ = 1−〈µ+1µ+s 〉. Thus we need to prove
that x(µ) := 〈µ+1µ+s 〉 < 1, resp. > 1, for µ > 0, resp. µ < 0. Note first that x(0) = 〈 1s 〉 = 1.
Let y(µ) := 〈(1− s)µ+1µ+s 〉. Mind that y is considered here as a function of µ for b = (bx) fixed.
Then
dy
dµ
= −〈 (1− s)
2
(µ+ s)2 〉 < 0 (E59)
Since y(0) = 〈 1s 〉 − 1 = 0, this means that y(µ) has opposite sign w.r. to µ. When µ > 0, we
get y(µ) < 0, or equivalently,
x(µ) < (1 + µ) 〈 s
s+ µ 〉 = (1 + µ)
(
1− 〈 µ
s+ µ 〉
)
= 1 + µ− µx(µ) (E60)
whence x(µ) < 1. When max
(
− 1,max{−sx, x ∈ X}
)
< µ < 0, we get y(µ) > 0, from which
x(µ) > 1 .
Consider now the case µ < min
(
− 1,min{−sx, x ∈ X}
)
. Let µ → −∞, then y(−∞) =
1 − 〈s〉 = 1 − 〈( 1s )−1〉 ≤ 1 − 〈 1s 〉−1 = 0 by Jensen’s inequality (which is coherent with the
previous analysis in the neighborhood of Kelly’s strategy, since y(−∞) = y(+∞) < 0). Then
(E59) still holds, so y(µ) < 0, or equivalently, x(µ) < 1 + µ − µx(µ) (see (E60)), and then
(since µ < −1) x(µ) > 1.
2. We let this time x(µ) := 〈Sµ+1µ+s 〉 and y(µ) := 〈(S − 1s )Sµ+1µ+s 〉. As in the previous point, only µ
is varied. Then
dy
dµ
= 〈 (Ss− 1)(S −
1
s )
(µ+ s)2 〉 > 0 (E61)
and y(0) = 0, hence y(µ) has same sign as µ. When µ > 0, we get y(µ) > 0, or equivalently,
Sx(µ) > 〈 Sµ+ 1
s(µ+ s) 〉
= 〈1
s
S(µ+ s) + 1− Ss
µ+ s 〉 = S +
1
µ
〈1
s
− 1
µ+ s 〉 − 〈
S
µ+ s 〉
= (S + 1
µ
)(1− 〈 1
µ+ s 〉) = S +
1
µ
− x(µ)
µ
(E62)
whence x(µ) > 1. When max
(
− 1/S,max{−sx, x ∈ X}
)
< µ < 0, on the other hand, we
get y(µ) < 0, from which (S + 1µ )x(µ) < S +
1
µ , whence (1 + µS)x(µ) > 1 + µS, giving still
x(µ) > 1.
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Assume now that µ < min
(
−1/S,min{−sx, x ∈ X}
)
. Let µ→ −∞, then y(−∞) = S2−S >
0 (which is, again, coherent with Kelly’s strategy value y(+∞) = y(−∞) > 0). The inequality
(E61) holds, whence y(µ) > 0, from which (S + 1µ )x(µ) > S +
1
µ (see (E62)), and (since
S + 1µ > 0), x(µ) > 1 still.
Proof of Theorem 2. The second derivative of the curve has same sign (see (E58)) as
F (µ) :=
{
(1 + µ)Lµ − 1
} {
S − (1 + Sµ)Lµ
}
. (E63)
Now,
F (µ) = − (1 + µ)Lµ − 1
µ
{
(1 + Sµ)(1− 〈 1
s+ µ 〉)− Sµ
}
=
{ (1 + µ)Lµ − 1
µ
} {
〈1 + Sµ
s+ µ 〉 − 1
}
(E64)
We now use Lemma 1 (2) and assume first that µ > 0. When µ > 0, 〈 1+Sµs+µ 〉 > 1 so F (µ) > 0;
thus that part of the front is strictly convex. Now (see eq. E17 and eq. (E50)), 12
dµ
dm =
1
2
d2(σ2W )
dm2 ≥
σW
d2σW
dm2 > 0, whence
d〈W 〉
dµ > 0. Starting from µ = 0+ and increasing µ, one thus moves through
the part of the lower front where 〈W 〉 > 0.
Assume now that µ < min
(
− 1,min{−sx, x ∈ X}
)
. Then F (µ) < 0; that part of the front is
strictly concave. This holds true in particular in a neighborhood of Kelly’s point on the upper front.
Assume finally that 0 > µ > max
(
− 1/S,max{−sx, x ∈ X}
)
. Then F (µ) < 0. That part of the
front is strictly concave. This holds true in particular (as seen using the same argument as in the
case µ > 0) in a neighborhood of the null strategy on the left, i.e. when 〈W 〉 < 0.
Appendix F: Details on numerical optimization
To find the optimal bets b∗ for every objective function and parameter values, we use a simulated
annealing algorithm, useful for global optimization problems in large search spaces, specially to
avoid local maxima solutions. Starting from an initial guess b0, a neighboring valid bets vector is
randomly generated. It is accepted with probability 1 if it produces an increase in the value of the
objective function J , that is, an “uphill” move. If not, then it is only accepted with probability
proportional to an exponential factor exp(−βJ), where β plays the role of an inverse temperature.
The algorithm is then repeated, increasing the value of β in each iteration. In the beginning, with a
small value for β “uphill” moves are allowed, although with less probability than “downhill” moves,
which avoids getting trapped in a local maximum. After a number of iterations, a stable value for
the bets vector is obtained that gives an approximation to the optimal one.
As explained in the main text, there is a phase transition in this model where the optimal
strategy changes from the null strategy to a mixed strategy when γ approaches γc. Because of this
transition, the Pareto front near the null strategy has a triangular shape, with a slope determined
by this critical γc as shown in Fig. 5.
The last figure of the main text, namely Fig 4, represents the Pareto border for 3 horses in
the correlated case. We provide here some details on the parameters used to make this figure. Let
P (i, j) = P (i|j) represents the conditional probabilities of horse i winning provided horse j won in
the previous round. Then P is 3 by 3 matrix, which we choose to be
P =
0.2 0.2 0.30.4 0.5 0.4
0.4 0.3 0.3
 .
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Figure 5: Zoom of the Pareto front shown in Fig 3 of the main text near the null strategy. The green
solid lines correspond to the linear approximation used near the null strategy and the black points
forming a dense region inside the front have been randomly chosen just as in Fig 3. The figure corre-
sponds to the case of three horses in the uncorrelated case with parameters p1 = 0.2, p2 = 0.4, r1 =
0.4, r2 = 0.2.
The odds of the first two horses are o1 = 4 (r1 = 1/4), o2 = 4 (r2 = 1/4), while the parameters of
the last horse are deduced by normalization of the bets and of the probabilities.
